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I. INTRODUCTION
When a spouse wishes to bequeath or devise his or her prop-
erty to someone other than the surviving spouse,' the stage is set
for a potential conflict between the state's interest in protecting
the surviving spouse against disinheritance and the testator's inter-
1. The North Carolina right to dissent statute accords both husband and wife
coextensive rights in the other's estate at probate. The use of "surviving spouse"
throughout this commentary applies by law to both spouses; however, "surviving
spouse" will usually refer to the wife here for illustrative purposes. Cf. Clark, The
Recapture of Testamentary Substitutes to Preserve the Spouse's Elective Share:
An Appraisal of Recent Statutory Reforms, 2 CONN. L. REV. 513 (1970) (stating
that although the statutes read that neither spouse may disinherit the other, the
primary object of the law's concern has traditionally been the widow).
449
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est in freedom of testation. Through the enactment of North Caro-
lina General Statutes sections 30-1 and 30-3,' the North Carolina
General Assembly has recognized the need to restrict the testator's
freedom of testation whenever its exercise threatens the state's in-
terest in protecting the surviving spouse from disinheritance. The
purpose of this commentary is not to quarrel with the public poli-
2. For purposes of this comment, discussion is limited to N.C. GEN. STAT. §§
30-1 and 30-3 (1984). N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 30-1 and 30-3 provide in pertinent part:
30-1. Right of Dissent.
(a) A spouse may dissent from his deceased spouse's will in those
cases where the aggregate value of the provisions under the will for bene-
fit of the surviving spouse, when added to the value of property or inter-
ests in property passing in any matter outside the will to the surviving
spouse as a result of the death of the testator:
(1) Is less than the intestate share of such spouse, or . . .
(3) Is less than the one half of the amount' provided by the Intestate
Succession Act in those cases where the surviving spouse is a second or
successive spouse and the testator has surviving him lineal descendants
by a former marriage and there are no lineal descendants surviving him
by the second or successive marriage.
(b) For the purpose of subsection (a) of this section and by way of
illustration and not of limitation, the following shall, subject to the ex-
ception hereinafter set forth, be included in the computation of the value
of the property or interest in property passing to the surviving spouse as
a result of the death of the testator:
(1) The value of a legal or equitable life estate for the life of the surviv-
ing spouse;
(2) The value of the proceeds of an annuity for the life of the surviving
spouse;
(3) The value of proceeds of insurance policies on the life of the decedent
received by the spouse;
(4) The value of any property passing by survivorship . . .
(5) The value of the principal of a trust under the terms of which the
surviving spouse holds a general power of appointment over the principal
of the trust estate .
30-3 Effect of Dissent.
(a) Upon dissent as provided for in G.S. 30-2, the surviving spouse
except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, shall take the same
share of the deceased spouse's real and personal property as if the de-
ceased had died intestate;
(b) Whenever the surviving spouse is a second or successive spouse,
he or she shall take only one half of the amount provided by the Intes-
tate Succession Act for the surviving spouse if the testator has surviving
him lineal descendants by a former marriage but there are no lineal de-
scendants surviving him by the second or successive marriage.
2
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cies underlying North Carolina's decision to protect the surviving
spouse; rather, the question explored is whether the state has em-
ployed the most effective means to implement this decision.
The decision by North Carolina lawmakers in 1959 to accord
the surviving spouse a fixed statutory share in the estate of the
deceased spouse, regardless of the wishes of the decedent as ex-
pressed in his will, was prompted by various policy concerns which
focus on the protection of the family unit. Among the specific justi-
fications for protection of the surviving spouse are a recognition
that: (1) a surviving spouse may be left financially destitute and
may become a financial burden on society while others who have
no better claim to the decedent's wealth benefit from the dece-
dent's lifetime accumulations, 3 (2) a surviving spouse may have
contributed to the accumulation of the deceased spouse's wealth,4
and (3) a surviving spouse may have a continued need for support
after the deceased spouse's death, especially if the surviving spouse
stood in a dependency relationship to the decedent.5
To further justify an infringement on the freedom of testation,
proponents of the protective forced share statutes point to the
prevalence of such protective devices throughout the United
States.' In addition, they argue that the legislature has the inher-
ent power to limit testamentary freedom. Most courts, including
the North Carolina Supreme Court, regard the question of testa-
mentary freedom as a statutory right,7 and "not one of those natu-
ral . . . rights which are supposed to precede all government, and
which no government can rightfully impair .... 8
Opponents of forced share statutes argue that forced share
statutes such as section 30-1 are anachronistic and rest on tenuous
3. Kurtz, The Augmented Estate Concept Under The Uniform Probate
Code: In Search Of An Equitable Elective Share, 62 IowA L. REV. 981, 1061
(1977).
4. Id. Recognition of one spouse's contribution to the other spouse's accumu-
lation of wealth for succession purposes parallels theoretically the equitable dis-
tribution of marital property upon divorce. It would be anomalous to compensate
a spouse for those "marital efforts" at divorce under equitable distribution and
deny a similar claim at death.
5. Id.
6. Almost every state offers some form of protection from disinheritance to
the surviving spouse whether it be in the form of dower, a fixed statutory share,
or community property.
7. 1 N. WIGGINS, Wills and Administration of Estates in North Carolina 6
(1964).
8. Pullen v. Commissioners, 66 N.C. 361, 363 (1872).
1986]
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policy grounds. Furthermore, the infringement of testamentary
freedom is unjustified. Critics also contend that the traditional
concerns of the law in protecting the spouse were formulated cen-
turies ago and are no longer warranted in light of present changed
attitudes, social patterns and realities.' To further buttress their
position, commentators point to the paucity of case law and empir-
ical evidence 10 which suggest that interspousal disinheritance is
infrequent.
Lack of empirical evidence and paucity of appellate case law
do not, however, diminish the legislative concern for protection of
the surviving spouse. One could logically argue that the present
scheme deters estate planning which would disinherit the surviving
spouse." Hence, this protective concept, rooted in the historical
foundations of probate law, remains with us in North Carolina and
in most other United States jurisdictions, notwithstanding modern
proposals that it be eliminated completely.
Has North Carolina used the best legislative formula to imple-
ment the state's policy of protecting the surviving spouse against
disinheritance? Faced with the competing policies of protecting the
spouse from disinheritance and allowing freedom of testation, the
North Carolina General Assembly enacted a statutory right to dis-
sent scheme which evinces traditional American sentiment favor-
ing preservation of the home. However, this statutory restraint
does not always secure the purpose for which it was enacted.
North Carolina appellate decisions indicate that "seeds of in-
equity" which require legislative attention have begun to germi-
nate from North Carolina's dissent statutes." This commentary fo-
cuses on three of the inequities which result from the present
scheme: (1) the discriminatory treatment of a second or successive
spouse, (2) the possibility that a surviving spouse may receive a
windfall beyond the designated statutory share, and (3) the "loop-
hole" which readily allows disinheritance of the surviving spouse.
9. Chaffin, Protection of the Surviving Spouse, COMPARATIVE PROBATE LAW
STUDIES 187, 202 (1977).
10. See Plager, The Spouse's Nonbarrable Share: A Solution in Search of a
Problem 33 U. CHI. L. REV. 681 (1966).
11. UNIF. PROB. CODE, art. II, pt. 2, general comment (1977) (stating that this
provision will operate to decrease substantially the number of elections because
the statute will provide a legal base for the counseling of testators against
schemes to disinherit a spouse).
12. See, e.g., Vinson v. Chappell 275 N.C. 234, 166 S.E.2d 686 (1969).
[Vol. 8:449
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II. HISTORY
A historical sketch of common law dower illustrates the age-
old concern over spousal disinheritance and represents the forerun-
ner to North Carolina's forced share statute. Dower was an institu-
tion of a period in history when land was the basis of wealth.1 3
Dower represented a wife's inchoate interest in the real property of
her husband which he could not defeat by will or inter vivos trans-
fer. 1 4 The fact that the wife did not hold a similar inchoate interest
in her husband's personal property was not significant since an in-
dividual's wealth in this early agrarian society existed primarily in
the form of realty, not personalty.15
With the passage of time, the American system of wealth
moved away from a basis in land and towards such personal prop-
erty holdings as stocks, bonds, and cash."6 As land became more an
article of commerce and less the foundation of a person's wealth,
the impediments to free transferability of the land resulting from
dower became more burdensome.' 7 Dower rights in real property
decreased its marketability by remaining as a cloud on title. The
danger of unknown dower rights and the necessity for extensive
title searches to determine these rights in a given parcel of land
depressed real estate prices.'
Not only did dower rights fetter commerce in land but also
with the shift of individual wealth from realty to personalty, dower
ceased to sufficiently serve the purpose for which it was created: to
provide some measure of social and economic security to the sur-
viving spouse through an interest in her deceased husband's real
estate.' The protective purpose of dower was defeated when the
principal assets of the average estate were personal property rather
than real estate.
The increased importance of personal property led to legisla-
tive concern over the wife's possible disinheritance and the limited
protection provided by dower. Most states0 responded with the
13. See generally 25 AM. JUR. 2D Dower and Curtesy § 3 (1966).
14. Id.
15. Kurtz, supra note 3, at 985.
16. Kossow, Probate Law and the Uniform Code: "One For the Money..
61 GEo. L.J. 1357, 1382 (1973).
17. Kurtz, supra note 3, at 987.
18. M. RHEINSTEIN, CASES ON DECEDENT'S ESTATES 67 (1955).
19. CHAFFIN, supra note 9, at 189.
20. The states without forced share statutes are generally the community
property states. Interestingly, similar public policies form the basis for both
1986]
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development of statutory concepts which augmented or substituted
for dower and curtesy an absolute interest in a specified fraction of
all real and personal property owned by the decedent at his or her
death.2' The "forced share" gave the surviving spouse the right to
dissent from the will and receive instead a statutory share 22 of the
probate estate notwithstanding the provisions in the will.
Realizing the need to augment dower in a manner compatible
with North Carolina's long-standing policies of protecting the
home and freedom of testation s3 the North Carolina General As-
sembly enacted the North Carolina forced share statute .2 This en-
actment has produced several positive changes in favor of both the
courts and the surviving spouse. The courts benefit by a forced
share statute which is relatively simple to administer; the probate
court need only determine the total value of the estate to which
the share applies and the applicable statutory share to which the
surviving spouse is entitled.25 When a-decedent's estate is com-
prised primarily of personal property, the surviving spouse benefits
from greater protection from disinheritance provided by a forced
share statute than that which dower provides.2"
On its face, the North Carolina forced share statute appears to
be an adequate means of protecting the surviving spouse from dis-
inheritance as well as providing a scheme which is simple to ad-
minister. 27 However, simplicity is available Only at a cost. Simplic-
ity, in fact, may be the typical forced share statute's downfall.
forced share statutes and community property laws. In community property
states, the surviving spouse is guaranteed one-half of the marital property which
provides some protection against disinheritance.
21. Bolich, Election, Dissent, and Renunciation, 39 N.C.L. REV. 17, 21 (1960).
22. The statutory share is often an intestate share, and in North Carolina,
the amount of the share depends on the circumstances. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 30-3.
23. Bolich, supra note 21, at 28.
24. Although this commentary is limited to the forced share statutes, a sur-
viving spouse in North Carolina may dissent and alternatively elect to take a life
interest in the deceased spouse's real estate. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-30 (1984)
for the election by a surviving spouse to take a life interest in lieu of an intestate
share. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-30 has the practical effect of providing the benefits of
dower to the surviving spouse.
25. Plager, supra note 10, at 682.
26. Kossow, supra note 16, at 1383. Forced share statutes differ from dower
by operating on all personal and real property that make up a decedent's estate.
Further, the surviving spouse will take a fee simple interest rather than a life
estate which improves the marketability of the interest. Id.
27. See, e.g., Kossow, supra note 16, at 1383.
454 [Vol. 8:449
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III. ANALYSIS
A. The Three Inequities
1. The Second or Successive Spouse Provision
Spouses who are displeased with their spouse's will have recip-
rocal rights to dissent from the other's will, this right being quali-
fied by section 30-1." s Assuming the right to dissent is established
and section 30-3(b) is inapplicable, section 30-3(a)29 provides that
the dissenting spouse takes the same share of the net probate es-
tate as he would have taken if the deceased spouse had died intes-
tate. This provision is similar to the forced share statutes presently
effective in other jurisdictions.
A surviving second or successive spouse's right to dissent"0 and
the share received upon dissent 3' is accorded different treatment in
North Carolina and represents a unique departure from the gen-
eral rule prevailing in the majority of jurisdictions which treats
first and second or successive spouses similarly for dissent pur-
poses. The North Carolina statute provides:
Whenever the surviving spouse is a second or successive spouse,
he or she shall take only one-half of the amount provided by the
Intestate Succession Act for the surviving spouse if the testator
has surviving him lineal descendants by a former marriage but
there are no lineal descendants surviving him by the second or
successive marriage.32
Wyoming 3 and Indiana 34 are the only other states which incorpo-
28. See supra note 2.
29. Id.
30. Supra note 2. (See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-1(a)(3)).
31. Supra note 2. (See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-3(b)).
32. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-3(b).
33. WvO. STAT. § 2-5-101 (1977).
[Tihe surviving spouse has a right of election to take an elective share of
the net probate estate as follows: (1) One-half, if there are no surviving
issue of the decedent, or if the surviving spouse is also a parent of any of
the surviving issue of the decedent; or (ii) One-fourth, if the surviving
spouse is not the parent of any surviving issue of the decedent.
Id. (emphasis supplied).
34. IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-3-1 (Burns Supp. 1986). The surviving spouse shall
be entitled to one-third of the net personal and real estate of the testator whereas
a second or subsequent spouse who had no children by the decedent and the dece-
dent left surviving him a child or descendant of a child by a previous spouse takes
one-third of the net personal estate and only a life estate in one-third of the testa-
tor's land. Id.
1986] 455
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rate similar provisions into their dissent statutes. The successive
spouse provision is subject to questions and criticism and has
prompted courts to apply strained interpretations of the statute in
order to reach a fair result.
a. Vinson v. Chappell
The North Carolina Supreme Court analyzed section 30-3(b)
in Vinson v. Chappell3 6 The plaintiff, surviving widow of the dece-
dent, filed a declaratory judgment action contesting the constitu-
tionality of section 30-3(b) successive spouse provision on substan-
tive due process grounds.3 6 The statute reduced her dissenter's
entitlement by one-half since she was the decedent's second wife
and met the other criteria stated in the statute." Although the
constitutionality of section 30-3(b) was upheld, 8 the court pro-
posed a five-part test, 9 each element to be met, before section 30-
3(b) would be applicable to a dissenting spouse.
The Vinson opinion clearly evidenced judicial questioning of
and concern over the wisdom and fairness underlying a successive
spouse provision which relegates a successive spouse to an inferior
status for dissent purposes. Inequities apparent on the face of the
statute were enumerated by the court, indicating its concern over
the statute: (1) If a successive spouse is the decedent and is not
survived by children or lineal descendants of a former marriage,
the surviving spouse dissenter will receive a full intestate share. "
Equal treatment of the husband and wife in a second marriage sit-
uation necessitates a change in section 30-3(b) to ensure that par-
ties receive the same share in the other's estate upon dissent. Oth-
erwise, a testator who has a child or lineal descendant by a former
35. 275 N.C. 234, 166 S.E.2d 686 (1969).
36. Id. at 236, 166 S.E.2d at 688.
37. See infra note 39.
38. Vinson, 275 N.C. at 242, 166 S.E.2d at 692.
39. Id. at 238, 166 S.E.2d at 689-90.
G.S. 30-3(b) applies only when these facts concur: (1) A married per-
son, husband or wife, dies testate, survived by his (her) spouse. (2) The
surviving spouse, being entitled under G.S. 30-1 to do so, dissents. (3)
The surviving spouse is a "second or successive spouse." (4) No lineal
descendants by the "second or successive marriage" survive the testator
(testatrix). (5) The testator (testatrix) is survived by lineal descendants
by his (her) former marriage.
Id. (emphasis in original).
40. Id. at 238, 166 S.E.2d at 690.
[Vol. 8:449
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marriage has greater freedom of testation as against a childless
successive spouse. 4' (2) The surviving successive spouse's inferior
rights are not dependent upon whether a child was born of the
marriage with the decedent; rather the rights depend upon
whether such child survives the decedent 42 in which case the dis-
senter's status would be elevated from the half-share provision to
the full intestate share provision. (3) The successive spouse statute
applies when the decedent is survived by a child of a former mar-
riage even if the decedent's will leaves nothing to such child.43 (4)
The application of section 30-3(b) does not rest upon any equitable
considerations such as the comparative durations of the first and
second marriages or the ages and financial status of the decedent's
children at the time of the decedent's death.44 Thus, the applica-
tion of section 30-3(b) to the above fact situations fails to produce
fair, justifiable results.
Are these seemingly unfair applications of section 30-3(b)
overridden by a strong public policy which provides a reasonable
basis for the disparate treatment of a first and second or successive
spouse? The Vinson court wavered in its commitment to finding a
distinct policy ground upon which to base the statute, stating,
"[T]he reasons that impelled the inclusion of this unusual provi-
sion in the 1959 Act are unclear.' 45 The court addressed the possi-
bility that the objective of this legislation was to discourage multi-
ple marriages by making it financially less desirable to marry a
widow or widower with issue by a prior marriage. 46 Refusing to
sanction this feeble policy argument, the court deferred to the leg-
islature for any statements of public policy. 47 The Vinson court in-
stead read the "legislative intent" behind the enactment of section
30-3(b) as a provision which would enable a person who had a
child by a former marriage to make greater testamentary provi-
sions for that child.48 Despite this brief statement that the statu-
tory provision may be supported by some valid legislative purpose,
the court's opinion focused on the "seeds of inequities"'4 9 arising
41. Id. at 240, 166 S.E.2d at 691.
42. Id. at 238-39, 166 S.E.2d at 690.
43. Id. at 239, 166 S.E.2d at 690.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 239, 166 S.E.2d at 691.
47. Id. at 239-40, 166 S.E.2d at 691.
48. Id. at 240, 166 S.E.2d at 691.
49. Id. at 241, 166 S.E.2d at 692.
19861 457
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out of section 30-3(b) and implied that a more meritorious objec-
tion to the provision's substance could be brought on grounds at-
tacking the wisdom and fairness of the statute rather than its
constitutionality.5
b. Phillips v. Phillips
At issue in Phillips v. Phillips51 were computational questions
arising from the interdependence of federal estate tax and net es-
tate amounts which were computed to determine the surviving
spouse's right to dissent under section 30-1.52 The Phillips court
expressed what it considered to be the rationale underlying the
North Carolina statute which modifies the successive spouse's
share in the decedent spouse's estate upon dissent. The court
stated that the statute's purpose was to protect the testator's chil-
dren by a former marriage against a "fortune hunting" second or
successive spouse." Restating the potentially unfair and unequal
applications of section 30-3(b) originally enumerated in Vinson,
the Phillips court concluded, "Solutions to the problems created
by our present dissent statutes must, of course, await legislative
action. '54
c. In re Estate of Edwards
Discontent with the unfairness inherent in section 30-3(b) sur-
faced once again in In re Estate of Edwards55 when a dispute arose
over the applicable share of the decedent's estate to which a suc-
cessive spouse dissenter was entitled. After a fifteen year marriage
during which the husband adopted two of his wife's five children
from a previous marriage, the wife died leaving her entire estate to
her five children from the previous marriage.56 The husband-peti-
tioner dissented from the will. At issue was a question of first im-
pression: Are two natural children of a testatrix, born during a pre-
50. Id. at 241-42, 166 S.E.2d at 692.
51. 296 N.C. 590, 252 S.E.2d 761 (1979).
52. For discussion concerning the mathematical computation of a second or
successive spouse's right to dissent, see Note, The Interrelated Computations In-
volved in Determining a Surviving Spouse's Right to Dissent, 16 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 251 (1980).
53. Phillips, 296 N.C. at 606, 252 S.E.2d at 771.
54. Id. at 607, 252 S.E.2d at 772.
55. 316 N.C. 698, 343 S.E.2d 913 (1986).
56. Id. at 699, 343 S.E.2d at 914-15.
[Vol. 8:449
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vious marriage and later adopted with her consent by her second
spouse, considered lineal descendants by the second marriage for
purposes of section 30-3(b) ? 5
After examining the legislative policy concerning the effect of
adoptions and the rights and obligations of surviving spouses, the
court in a 6-3 decision determined that the children were born of
the second marriage and were "lineal descendants by the second
marriage" within the meaning of section 30-3(b).5 8 The court held
that an adoption order created a new bloodline by law as would
have been created by nature had the testatrix given birth to natu-
ral children of her union with her second spouse. 59 For purposes of
section 30-3(b), the Edwards court determined there were lineal
descendants by the testatrix's second marriage because the testa-
trix's consent to her husband's adoption of her two minor children
was tantamount to the couple's producing their own offspring. 60
In a dissenting opinion in which two justices concurred, Jus-
tice Exum disagreed with the majority's conclusion that the adop-
tion of the two children changed the children's previous relation-
ship to their mother, making them lineal descendants of their
mother by her second marriage."1 The dissenting opinion argued
that the majority circumvented the plain language of section 30-
3(b),62 and failed to perceive the effect of adoption by a stepparent
with the consent of his spouse, the biological parent.63
Although the precise language of section 30-3(b) does not eas-
ily produce an equitable outcome in an adoption situation, the ma-
jority of the North Carolina Supreme Court reached its result by
considering the legislative purpose behind the adoption and dis-
sent statutes. The 6-3 decision, however, indicates that the court
members were sharply split-in their opinion of the proper outcome.
The plain language of North Carolina's peculiar successive spouse
provision again surfaced, proving itself difficult to integrate with
another area of the law: adoptions.
57. Id. at 699, 343 S.E.2d at 914.
58. Id. at 710, 343 S.E.2d at 920-21.
59. Id. at 706, 343 S.E.2d at 918.
60. Id. at 708, 343 S.E.2d at 920.
61. Id. at 710, 343 S.E.2d at 921 (Exum, J., dissenting).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 711-14, 343 S.E.2d at 921-23 (Exum, J., dissenting).
19861
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2. The Possibility of a Windfall
North Carolina's dissent statutes represent the legislative
meshing of diametrically opposed public policies. Through the pro-
mulgation of these statutes, the General Assembly declares that
the testator's privilege to give his property to such objects of his
bounty as he chooses will be recognized so long as the testator first
makes certain provisions required by statute for his surviving
spouse.
Dissension from a spouse's will is a two-part process in North
Carolina whereby the dissenter must first meet the requirements of
section 30-1(a) which offers the surviving spouse a qualified right
to dissent. Under section 30-1(a), the surviving spouse establishes
the right to dissent if
the aggregate value of the provisions under the will for the benefit
of the surviving spouse, when added to the value of the property
or interests in property passing in any manner outside the will to
the surviving spouse as a result of the testator: (1) is less than the
intestate share of such spouse .... 14
In theory, this legislation is designed to protect both the surviving
spouse and the testator. The surviving spouse is protected from
disinheritance by a statute which establishes the right to dissent.
The testator's freedom of testation is likewise protected because
the statute denies the surviving spouse a share of the testator's net
estate when he or she is adequately provided for by property pass-
ing outside the probate estate.
The first part of the right to dissent process operates well to
keep the dissenting spouse from getting a "lion's share" 5 of the
decedent's estate, primarily because of the consideration given to
property passing outside the will. Section 30-1(b) lists "by way of
illustration and not limitation," certain outside property or inter-
ests which are to be included in the computation of the surviving
spouse's right to dissent:
(1) The value of a legal or equitable life estate for the life of the
surviving spouse;
(2) The value of the proceeds of an annuity for the surviving
spouse;
64. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-1(a) (1984). Discussion of the possibility of a wind-
fall is limited in this commentary to surviving spouses who are entitled to a full
intestate share and to second or successive spouses.
65. See Bolich, supra note 21, at 30.
[Vol. 8:449
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(3) The value of proceeds of insurance policies on the life of the
decedent received by the spouse;
(4) The value of any property passing by survivorship . . .
(5) The value of the principal of a trust under the terms of which
the surviving spouse holds a general power of appointment over
the principal of the trust estate . . ..
Property or interests in property passing outside the probate
estate to the surviving spouse have a significant effect on the equa-
tion used to determine the surviving spouse's dissent rights. For
example, Don, the decedent, died testate leaving a net estate of
$50,000 of which $10,000 was bequeathed to Susan, the surviving
spouse and the remainder to his parents. At Don's death, Susan
also collected $20,000 in life insurance proceeds as the beneficiary
of Don's life insurance policy. Assuming Susan's statutory intestate
share is one-half of Don's net estate, does she have the right to
dissent? Since Susan's total benefits derived from property passing
under the will and outside the will total $30,000, she does not have
the right to dissent under section 30-1(a)(1). In a jurisdiction
where the forced share operates only on the probate estate assets,
Susan would be credited with receiving $10,000 in property and
could dissent against the will to take an additional $15,000 from
the shares of the testator's intended takers under the will.
The policies underlying the dissent statute are ultimately de-
feated, however, after the right to dissent is established and the
second step in the dissent process is applied. North Carolina sec-
tion 30-3 governs the effect of dissent and provides the spouse with
a full intestate share without requiring non-probate assets passing
to the spouse be renounced. The potential problem of double com-
pensation becomes apparent. When a surviving spouse receives
property outside the probate estate which is slightly less in value
than her intestate share and receives little or no property under
the will, she qualifies to dissent under the first step of the process
governed by section 30-1(a). Under the second step in the process
governed by section 30-3, the surviving spouse is entitled to receive
a full intestate share6 7 in addition to retaining the nonprobate as-
sets. The result is a "windfall" to the surviving spouse at the ex-
pense of the beneficiaries under the will. 8 For example, a surviving
66. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
67. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-14 (1984).
68. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-3(c) (1984) provides:
If the surviving spouse dissents from his or her deceased spouse's will
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spouse who receives $40,000 in life insurance benefits at her
spouse's death and another $10,000 under the will can establish a
right to dissent where the probate estate is $62,000 and the dis-
senter's intestate share is one-half the net estate. Upon dissent, the
dissenting spouse "renounces" the $10,000 received under the will
and receives instead one-half of the probate estate, $31,000. In ad-
dition, the surviving spouse retains the $40,000 insurance proceeds.
The total received by the dissenting spouse is $71,000 out of a net
estate of $102,000. Hence, the testator who provides for his spouse
by such section 30-1(b) "outside properties" 9 as life insurance or
co-ownership of property with survivorship rights is subject to
have his estate plans upset by a dissenting spouse who elects to
take a forced share.
By applying one set of criteria for determining whether the
right to dissent exists and another for determining the effect of the
dissent, the legislature has effectively upset the compromise be-
tween the competing policies of protection of the spouse and free-
dom of testation. What initially appears to be an effective solution
to the competing policy concerns under section 30-1 is quickly bro-
ken down upon the application of section 30-3. The dissent stat-
utes' "seeds of inequities" once again manifest themselves in a
windfall situation where the surviving spouse becomes "overpro-
tected" from disinheritance while the decedent's freedom of testa-
tion sustains a major blow through disruption of his estate plan.
3. The Possibility of Disinheritance
By the enactment of North Carolina's forced share statutes,
the state declares as public policy the protection of the surviving
spouse against disinheritance, but because the statutes are silent as
to a decedent's inter vivos transfers of property, an ominous loop-
hole exists which readily allows spousal disinheritance by a testa-
tor. As a rule, forced share statutes restrict only the testamentary
disposal of property.70 In North Carolina, to the extent that a sur-
and takes an intestate share as provided herein, the residue of the testa-
tor's net estate, as defined in G.S. 29-2, shall be distributed to the other
devisees and legatees as provided in the testator's last will diminished
pro rata unless the will otherwise provides.
Id. The effect of reducing the shares devised to beneficiaries under the will is to
upset the testator's estate plan, thereby undercutting his freedom of testation.
69. See supra note 2 for a complete listing.
70. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1322 (5th ed. 1979) defines testamentary dispo-
sition as "[a] disposition of property by way of gift, will, or deed which is not to
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viving spouse's forced share is carved out of the decedent's net es-
tate, lifetime transfers by the decedent potentially deplete the size
of the net estate and, ultimately, the spouse's forced share. 1
The application of the forced share to a decedent's estate
property exemplifies the insensitivity of the statute to modern
trends in property transferral. Probate is no longer the exclusive
means of wealth transmittal; the modern trend favors property ar-
rangements that avoid probate.72 These arrangements include inter
vivos trusts, joint tenancies and other so-called "will substitutes"
which have the effect of defeating the spouse's forced share by
completely depleting the probate estate. Thus, the determined
spouse-hater can disinherit his spouse by eliminating most of the
property in his probate estate against which the dissenting
spouse's forced share may be exercised. 73 Accomplished through
one of the many inter vivos transfer schemes, the decedent need
only rid himself of technical title while retaining the use and con-
trol of the property for his life.74 "He is inconvenienced but not
pauperized, and his wife is left holding an empty bag."
75
The silence of the North Carolina legislature on the problems
of inter vivos "evasions" imposes a heavy responsibility on the
courts to formulate tests to deal with deliberate attempts to defeat
a spouse's forced share by such transfers. 7 From a study of judicial
responses in many jurisdictions 77 to the problem of inter vivos
transfers, three distinct tests emerge, designed to determine
whether a lifetime transfer is effective to defeat the surviving
spouse's dissent share. These judicial solutions or tests appear to
depend on the competing equities and the type of transfer
involved. 78
The illusory transfer test 79 is used by courts to set aside inter
vivos transfers where the decedent retains an excessive amount of
take effect unless the grantor dies or until that event."
71. See Annot., 39 A.L.R.3D 14 (1971).
72. Chaffin, supra note 9, at 192.
73. See Clark, supra note 1, at 514.
74. For extensive analysis of the various will substitutes and evasion tech-
niques, see W. MACDONALD, FRAUD ON THE WIDOW'S SHARE (1960).
75. Clark, supra note 1, at 514.
76. W. MACDONALD, supra note 74, at 4.
77. See generally W. MACDONALD, supra note 74.
78. Kurtz, supra note 3, at 1006.
79. See generally W. MACDONALD, supra note 74, at 67-97 (discusses the use
of the illusory transfer test in various jurisdictions).
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control over, or beneficial interest in, the property transferred. The
leading case upholding the right of a surviving spouse to void an
inter vivos transfer in trust on the ground that it was illusory is
Newman v. Dore."° The court enunciated a test of "illusoriness",
focusing on whether the transferor in good faith 8 divested himself
of property ownership.
The fraudulent intent test is used to void inter vivos transfers
which reflect a decedent's intent to defraud the surviving spouse of
her statutory share. Because the court must ascertain the fraudu-
lent intent of a transferor who is deceased, the elusiveness of the
intent test has required that jurisdictions using this test modify
the doctrine to include consideration of the equities involved.82
The "reality test, ' 83 however, sustains an inter vivos transfer
against attack by a surviving spouse if the transfer has validity in-
dependent of any questions concerning the rights of a dissenting
spouse. 4 Sham transfers or testamentary transfers appear to be
the only transfers subject to a spouse's attack under the reality
test.85
Despite the test a jurisdiction purports to apply in these cases,
the decisions rely essentially on competing equities presented by
the parties in light of the facts and circumstances of each case.
Among the competing equities considered by the courts are the
size of the inter vivos transfer, the proximity of the transfer to the
transferor's death, the relationship between transferor and trans-
feree, and the financial conditions of the rival claimants.88
The North Carolina Court of Appeals had occasion to rule on
the validity of an inter vivos trust which impaired the distributive
80. 275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E.2d 966 (1937). In an attempt to defeat his widow's
statutory rights, the testator created an inter vivos trust of all his property three
days before his death and retained the income for life and the power to revoke the
trust. The Newman Court sustained the widow's attack on the grounds that the
trust was "illusory."
81. Id. at 379, 9 N.E.2d at 969.
82. See W. MACDONALD, supra note 74, at 98.
83. Id. at 120-44. See, e.g., In re Halpern, 303 N.Y. 33, 100 N.E.2d 120
(1951).
84. This judicial doctrine is based on the theory that a transfer is immune
from a spouse's attack if the transfer is operative between the parties or is com-
plete or is one in which the transferee obtained a present interest in the subject
matter of the transfer as soon as it was made. W. MAcDONALD, supra note 74, at
120.
85. Id.
86. See W. MACDONALD, supra note 74, at 145-74.
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share of a surviving spouse in a case of first impression, Moore v.
Jones.87 The settlor of the trust in Moore retained the right to
withdraw assets from the trust, change the beneficiaries, and to
modify, amend, add to, or revoke the trust.88 The court held that
an admittedly valid inter vivos trust, revocable by the grantor, is
ineffective only as it impairs the spouse's statutory rights.89 Except
to the extent of the spouse's forced share interest in the trust, the
court held the trust was valid and could be carried out in accor-
dance with its terms.90 Couching its rationale in public policy
terms, the court favored protection of the surviving spouse from
disinheritance over the policy promoting free alienability of prop-
erty by the decedent.9 1 In addition, the court noted the excessive
powers retained by the settlor over the trust assets, powers "so ex-
tensive that in a real sense he has the same rights therein after
creating the trust as he had before its creation . .9.2. Concluding
that the trust assets should be considered part of the settlor's es-
tate insofar as his surviving spouse's forced share rights were con-
cerned, the Moore court reached an equitable result by applying
the "excessive control/illusory transfer" test and weighing the con-
flicting public policy concerns at issue.
These judicially-devised tests for evaluating inter vivos trans-
fers are not without substantial criticism. 3 While the decisions do
achieve rough equity through ad hoc balancing of individual cir-
cumstances and facts, the weakness of this approach lies in the to-
87. 44 N.C. App. 578, 261 S.E.2d 289 (1980).
88. Id. at 579, 261 S.E.2d at 290.
89. Id. at 583, 261 S.E.2d at 292. The Moore Court stated the issue as:
[Wihether the assets held in trust over which the settlor retained such
extensive powers at the time of his death should be properly considered
as part of his estate for purposes of (1) determining plaintiff's right to
dissent under G.S. § 30-1 and (2) computing the share of his estate to
which the plaintiff is entitled under G.S. § 30-3(a) should her right to
dissent be established.
Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. The Moore Court stated: "Recognizing the conflicting public policy
considerations which decision of this appeal involves ... we hold that the public
policy favoring protection of a surviving spouse against disinheritance, which has
been adopted and expressed by our legislature by enactment of Article 1 of G.S.
Ch. 30, should prevail." Id.
92. Id.
93. See, e.g., Kurtz, supra note 3, at 994; Bolich, supra note 21, at 23; W.
MACDONALD, supra note 74, at 5.
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tal lack of predictable results."' Courts have found it difficult to
formulate a general rule which is at once broad enough to include
all types of will substitutes and yet personalized enough to achieve
a fair result on the individual level.9 5
The difficulty of reaching a consensus of judicial opinion on
the treatment of will substitutes is likely attributable to the cross-
currents of conflicting public policy underlying the issue. The
Moore court made a policy statement that North Carolina recog-
nizes the spousal protection policy over the commercially desirable
interest in the inter vivos alienability of property."
Commentators indicate that the final definitive answer to the
inter vivos problem lies with the legislature. 7 Confronted with
questions concerning the North Carolina dissent statutes, various
courts explicitly state that public policy determinations are a mat-
ter for the legislature, and that changes in the manner of distribu-
tion to a surviving spouse of an interest in the decedent spouse's
estate is a matter for the General Assembly. 8
B. Ameliorating the Inequitites
1. The Second or Successive Spouse Provision
Both the North Carolina Supreme Court and Court of Appeals
have had the occasion to apply North Carolina section 30-3(b) and
both courts have made the plea that legislative action be taken re-
garding the statute. The courts have had difficulty finding a proper
rationale for applying the statute, especially when equitable con-
siderations in a given case militate against the statute's harsh, un-
justifiable results. Sound public policy arguments supporting sec-
tion 30-3(b) are noticeably lacking.
Statistics on marriages, divorces, remarriages, and the median
age at remarriage99 suggest that a statute according second spouses
unequal treatment upon dissent is anachronistic-assuming the
statute had some purpose at a past point in time. For example, the
median duration of marriage for the past twenty years has been
approximately 6.8 years.' 0 When this average is compared to the
94. Kurtz, supra note 3, at 1006.
95. Clark, supra note 1, at 523.
96. Moore, 44 N.C.App. at 583, 261 S.E.2d at 292.
97. See, e.g., 1 N. WIGGINS § 158 (1964).
98. See, e.g., Phillips, 296 N.C. at 607, 252 S.E.2d at 772.
99. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 80 (105th Ed. 1985).
100. Id.
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fifteen years duration of the second marriages in Edwards and
Vinson, any reasons for applying section 30-3(b) become increas-
ingly perplexing. Furthermore, from the sizeable increase in the di-
vorce rate from 1960 to 1980, a reasonable inference can be made
that a comparable increase in the number of remarriages is occur-
ring and will continue to occur in the future. With the status of
"second spouse" becoming more commonplace, the disparate treat-
ment of first and second spouses appears unjustifiable.
The most effective legislative action to mitigate the unjust
consequences of section 30-3(b) is to abolish the provision. No ap-
parent public policy bases are so sound or strong in support of the
provision that they offset the inconsistencies and inequities arising
from section 30-3(b). In the event that abolition of section 30-3(b)
is unpalatable to legislators, an alternate proposal is to incorporate
Vinson's equitable consideration(s) 10' into the statute which would
eliminate some of the harsh effects of section 30-3(b).
2. The Possibility of a Windfall
Inadequate legislative attention to property passing from the
decedent outside the net probate estate to the surviving spouse ac-
counts for the possibility that a surviving spouse may receive a
windfall upon dissent.' 2 The difference in criteria used to deter-
mine the spouse's right to dissent 03 and the distributive share
upon dissent" is the culprit which upsets the successful imple-
mentation of conflicting public policies underlying North Caro-
lina's dissent statutes.
The simplest legislative change to eliminate the inconsistent
outcomes arising from section 30-3 is to credit the amount of
outside property interests passing to the dissenter, such as insur-
ance proceeds and survivorship rights in joint accounts, against the
dissenter's intestate share. In other words, apply the criteria used
to determine the right to dissent to determine the distributive
share as well. Suppose, for example, that the decedent died testate
with a net probate estate of $50,000, none of which is left to the
surviving spouse, and $20,000 passing outside the will to the sur-
viving spouse as survivorship rights in a joint bank account. Under
101. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
102. Note, Decedents' Estates-Does North Carolina Law Adequately Pro-
tect Surviving Spouses?, 48 N.C.L. REv. 361, 366 (1970).
103. See supra note 2.
104. Id.
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the present section 30-3, assuming the spouse's intestate share in
one-half of the net estate, the spouse is entitled to dissent and take
$25,000 of the net probate estate in addition to keeping the
$20,000 passing to her outside the will. On the other hand, if the
suggested change in section 30-3 was made, the $20,000 passing to
the spouse outside the will would be credited against her elective
share and the spouse would receive only $5,000 from the probate
estate. The second result represents the restoration of an equilib-
rium between the policies of protection for the spouse and the
freedom of testation. The testator's estate plan is upset only as to
$5,000 which requires a pro rata contribution from the benefi-
ciaries under his will as opposed to a $25,000 contribution under
the present law.
A more comprehensive approach to eliminating the windfall
situation would be accomplished by the adoption of the Uniform
Probate Code's "augmented estate" provision."'B One of the pur-
poses of the augmented estate concept is to prevent the surviving
spouse who has already received a fair share of the decedent's
wealth during his life, or at his death from outside properties, from
electing a share of the probate estate.1 °0 By including all the prop-
erty owned by the surviving spouse at the decedent's death which
was derived from the decedent other than by will or intestate suc-
cession, the surviving spouse's share upon dissent is reduced.107
The comprehensive approach of the augmented estate concept ne-
cessitates complexity, but however complicated the provision may
be, it is certainly more effective than the North Carolina statute in
balancing the goals of protecting the surviving spouse from disin-
heritance against the decedent's freedom of testation and interests
of other donees.108 Additionally, the augmented estate concept re-
105. UNIF. PROB. CODE, art. II, § 2-202 (1977) [hereinafter cited as U.P.C.].
U.P.C. § 2-201 provides the surviving spouse take one-third of what is known as
the "augmented estate." The augmented estate includes probate property, gratui-
tous lifetime transfers to persons other than the surviving spouse, and the prop-
erty of the spouse derived from the decedent.
106. By way of illustration, outside properties would include such property
interests as the interest of the spouse in any trust created by the decedent during
his lifetime, proceeds of life insurance, and outright gifts by decedent to the
spouse. See U.P.C. § 2-202 comment.
107. While this property increases the augmented estate, it also counts as
part of the one-third share of the spouse.
108. See Curry, Intestate Succession and Wills: A Comparative Analysis of
Article II of the Uniform Probate Code and the Law of Ohio, 34 Ohio St. L.J.
114, 138 (1973).
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lies on a mathematical computation of the spouse's share which
corresponds with North Carolina's long-standing mathematical ap-
proach taken towards dower and its forced share statute.
To the extent that a surviving spouse's actual economic needs
are ignored by forced share statutes, the statute may provide un-
necessary protection for the spouse.' °9 One commentator has pro-
posed a "Model Decedent's Family Maintenance Act" which elimi-
nates the forced share concept and authorizes courts to award
maintenance payments out of the decedent's estate to a surviving
spouse on the basis of need."10 The advantage of this approach is
the flexibility to shape the remedy in each individual's case, rather
than to apply an arithmetic system of justice; however, the courts
must be given a broad measure of discretion to assess the spouse's
need."' Serious objections exist to allowing courts to dispose of a
decedent's assets in whatever way a particular judge regards as
just."' In addition, the potential undue burden on the courts must
be assessed before the luxury of individuation can be afforded.
3. The Possibility of Disinheritance
Legislative inattention to property interests passing outside
the net probate estate is again the culprit which provides the testa-
tor with the opportunity to deplete his probate estate through in-
ter vivos transfers which have the deleterious effect of disinheriting
a surviving spouse. Once again, the Uniform Probate Code's aug-
mented estate concept suggests a solution."' 3 The augmented es-
tate extends not only to probate assets, but to a limited number of
inter vivos transfers as well, especially those commonly used as will
substitutes. This system assures the surviving spouse of a share in
both the probate estate and certain assets passed outside the pro-
bate process.
109. Kurtz, supra note 3, at 1009.
110. W. MACDONALD, supra note 74, at 299-327. The proposal consists of
family maintenance legislation buttressed with anti-evasion provisions.
111. Id. at 300.
112. Chaffin, supra note 9, at 195.
113. Included in the augmented estate under U.P.C. § 2-202 are transfers
made by the decedent during marriage other than to surviving spouse without
receipt of consideration in money or money's worth providing the transfer is (1)
one with retained benefits or controls, or (2) one held at time of death with an-
other with right of survivorship, or (3) transfers made within two years of death
of the decedent that exceed $3,000. Thus, most will substitutes mentioned earlier
will be caught in the augmented estate.
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The Uniform Probate Code's approach has basically the same
underpinnings as the "gross estate" solution." 4 Under the gross es-
tate approach, the property and interests on which the decedent
would be taxed according to federal estate regulations, are consid-
ered part of his net estate for dissent purposes."' Basically, the
spouse's claim would "affect" any property in which the decedent
had a beneficial interest at his death, or which the decedent trans-
ferred in contemplation of death." 6 Either the augmented estate
concept or the gross estate approach represents an improvement
over North Carolina's present statute. These two approaches would
provide predictability for the estate planner and would not be too
difficult to administer since the tax regulations are definitive and
the legal profession is familiar with them."' The answer to the
problem must provide protection for the surviving spouse from dis-
inheritance, security of title for the transferee, and some degree of
predictability in estate planning for the decedent."'
IV. CONCLUSION
Over the course of North Carolina's history, measures to pro-
vide for the surviving spouse against disinheritance have emanated
from the courts and legislature. The legislature has attempted to
balance the public's interest in protecting the spouse from disin-
heritance against the interest in freedom of testation and the com-
mercial necessity of unfettered transfer of property. The legisla-
ture purported to establish an equilibrium between these two
competing concerns through the enactment of North Carolina's
forced share statutes. The statutes, sections 30-1 and 30-3, how-
ever, fall short of the legislative goals.
Beginning with Vinson, the courts have enumerated the incon-
sistencies and unfairness arising from the dissent provisions and
have explicitly stated that legislative reform should be the solu-
tion. The lack of sound policy bases for the second or successive
spouse provision support the abolition of a provision which serves
only to produce unequal and unjustifiable results. Other legislative
114. See generally W. MACDONALD, supra note 74, at 276.
115. But see, I R. WELLMAN, UNIFORM PROBATE CODE PRACTICE MANUAL
(1977) (U.P.C. § 2-202 comment notes subtle differences between federal estate
tax law and U.P.C. § 2-202).
116. W. MACDONALD, supra note 74, at 276.
117. Id.
118. Id. at ix.
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action encouraged is the enactment of a provision which would re-
quire property already received by the surviving spouse to be
credited against his or her elective share in order that a dissenting
spouse does not receive a "windfall" at the expense of the dece-
dent's other beneficiaries. Additionally, the disinheritance of a sur-
viving spouse could be curtailed by the enactment of a provision
which would treat certain inter vivos transfers in a similar manner
for both dissent and federal estate tax purposes.
If the legislature intends to achieve a balance between the pol-
icies of protecting the spouse from disinheritance and the freedom
of testation, the protection should not be spurious. It is senseless
to have a protective policy and then provide means whereby the
policy is easily defeated. The flaws in the dissent statutes can be
remedied, but the solutions require legislative action. "In the
meantime, bench and bar, executors and surviving spouses must
cope with the existing statutes as best they can"'1 9 as the seeds of
inequities continue to germinate and grow from the statutory dis-
sent provisions.
Anne Mayo Evans
119. Phillips, 296 N.C. at 607, 252 S.E.2d at 772.
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